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1. We have to  seek the new tendencies appearing in  the  contract 
condicions of the ecenomical organizations, no t so much in the  charac­
teristics of these contracts, b u t in the disposition referring to  the  general 
rules o f agreements under the modified C. L. (1977 annual IV. lw .).
I t  was impossible to  a tta in  these rules by the  means of an even road, 
nor by an unbroken impulse. The socialist common-law of H ungary has 
made alm ost the same developm ent in its contracts o f economical ins­
titu tions, as the  progress of Law made in Europe (World), up to  the 
present tim e, since the disposition of roman-law. W hether i t  was neces- 
sery to  make it th a t  way, or not, it  is no t for th is treatise  to  decide.
This tim e we rem ain by historical fact only, and not sto ry  writing, 
ra the r to  try  to begin in historical perspectives, a short socialist — and 
here analysing the  hungarian progress only, m aybe tak ing  also the  chance 
of being antihistorical, and perhaps with enough conviction we can gladly 
accejit i t  — we w ant to  show, th a t  every s ta r t is difficult, also th a t, i f  we 
make of this difficulty of beginning, a  binding virtue, i t  stops-short, or 
slows-down the development.
The underestim ation of the  common compulsory force o f contract, 
and the overestim ation of the  role of standardcontract, undoughtedly 
m anifested itself a t  the early stages of building socialism. One also comes 
across a  certain occurance of atavism  in the contract system  of the  old 
adm inistration.
Vékâs points a t — using an enormous wide scale of researches — 
the  long extention of tim e i t  took to  acknowledge, and to  have the com­
mon compulsory force of contract recognised as such in the continental 
law, which were based upon the roman-law, and also in the field of the 
supplem entary common-law. He sees the reason for this m ainly in the 
dem and of goods being underdeveloped, or m ight have been developing 
powerfully, bu t were based on the  great reputation of the  roman-law, 
and yet in Endland the ideology — established on the effect of the com­
promise revolution — were having difficulty of accepting the common 
compulsory force of contract. Referring to  those tim es and the  outcome 
of th a t  tim e, he writes the following wray!
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„Summing i t  all up we can say, th a t  the codifications passed of a t 
the tu rn  of the 18"' 19,h century have had decisive significance of the 
fu tu re  of standard  contracts. Law-books being created a t th a t  tim e „so 
to  say ” have passed the standard  contracts from common-law — taken 
th e ir origin from the roman-law-, into the capitalist private-law: so in 
the  consequence of acknowledgem ent of the common compulsory force 
of contract, the  s tandard  agreem ents lost their old functions and gained 
a new mission as creative elements of the  Codes. Some parts of the s ta n d ­
ard  contracts by the extinguishm ent of s tandard  coercions — recapitu­
lated  from roman-law — have become the  kernel of the universal norms 
of contract, and although meaningless and beside also converted their 
functions, were com petent to  be the fundam ental principles of the con­
tra c t law in the law-books. The civilcode above all, and the Austrian 
ABGB too, definitely reflect th is transform ation: the individual standard- 
agreem ents are the building-m aterials of the Codes, which — with their 
dispositive rules and concept — determ inant declarations — were to 
secure the orientations of the financial turnovers, flowing between the 
wide-cut banks of contract freedoms of the  bourgeois, through the means 
of giving help to  the decisions of the  litigations.”1
Lookind a t  the developm ent in H ungary, we can observe the follow­
ing: the tim e since the liberation o f H ungary un til now, in the conventions 
concerning the  institu tions of social property, and also in search of the 
theory: between the years of 1945— 1950 the common obligational force, 
and from 1950 — 1969 the  standard  contracts, have had the greater sig­
nificance. A fter the year of 1908 in a peculiar way a “double au th o rity ” 
is being developed. On one hand the num ber of standard contracts are 
increasing among the managing institu tional contracts, and on the o ther 
hand the recognition o f the common obligational force of contract is 
developing more and more.
Tf we to ta l up the power of th is “double au th o rity ” , and of those 
“taking p a r t” in it, we find, th a t the  public ownership — respectively 
in the circles of contracts of the managing organs — the  standard  is 
dom inating even th is present tim e, (reflects this th e  increasing num ber of 
standard  contracts, and their rugulation by the law) exceptionally by 
those cases, which are standing outside the  C. L.: bu t the acknowledge­
m ent of the common obligational force of contract more and more increas­
ingly pushes its way through in the legislation.
The main stages of the route: the  early parts of the 1950’s: there is 
no C. L. the contracts settled by public ownerships are standing outside 
the public-law, they do not belonge to  the  there established agreement 
typs, nor does the gereral rules of contract refer to them . Among some 
managing organs, and among particu lar owners, there is only one way of 
signing a contract on certain products aeknowledgeable and sanctioned 
as binding agreement by the  practice of the Court, and the board of re­
ferees.
The control of adm inistration makes it  impossible to  conclude any 
other kind of contract. Among the managing organs o f —except in the
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relation of turnovers between wholesalers and retailers — there is no 
“googs” contract to  fail a delivery agreement.
A fter the C. L. in 1959, the  situation  in principal is the  same, bu t 
there is already a certain am ount of progressing “backw ards” . The gene­
ral rules refering to  the  contract law p a rt o f the  C. L., do no t yet really 
affect the contracts of national economy, b u t there exists already the 
“p lancon trac t”, a combined category o f agreem ent tak ing  up position 
in the cases of individual agreements. In  comparison to  the  198 §, de­
claring the common compulsory force o f contract, they  can be regarded 
as the penurious unassum ing general parts of the  national economical 
contracts, staying always outside the C. L., and also as some k ind of 
independent agreement. The te x t of the s ta tu to ry  provision d istinctly  
point a t  this. However even the practice of economical decision of court, 
only in case of “emergency” turns to  the 397 §, and 407 § of the  CLb., 
and  takes a  greater consideration in account, to  th is chapter of the  CLb. 
only after the economical reform, and even then, — so far it  is possible — 
stays a t  the  single — behind the stronghold of particu lar plan — con­
tracts, in reality  consisting of m ainly individual characteristics — (it is 
revealing, th a t  in the publication called the  “W ith au tho rita tive  posi­
tions taken by the  Highes Court of the CLb. (1975) had  no t taken  any 
o f OK. GKT. positions in th is publications, which were dated  before 
1973). We have to  look for the  reason of this a t  the next stage o f progres­
sing “backw ards” .
I t  becomes evident, m ainly a t the preparation  of the adm in istra ­
tion ’s new force of controls, b u t particularly  in the circum stances of 
realization, th a t  those few “ plan contracts” recognised as such by the 
law, are not able to  fulfil the notes of “con tract” of the economical life.
The esange stars in two directions. In  one way by m ultiplying the 
species of agreements, on the o ther way by m odifying (in more places) 
the “general” p a rt of the standard  contracts. The love for s tan d a rd  is 
still very strong, b u t the desire is always g reater of getting  away from 
this prison of standard  into the free course.
This m otion is particular^’ vivid among enterprises, building up 
activ ities which are more and more complicated, and versatil. Free course, 
colorfull meadow will not be ju st yet, bu t the rooms of the towers are 
increasing, and are getting  full of charms (increase in num ber o f stan- 
dars), and on the “path  of sronghold” the respiration becomes always 
easier. (The m odification of the XX XV. section of CLb., and the  more 
frequented look-out of the judicial practice).
The only possible way to  escape from this prison of s tandard  leeds 
even afterw ards m ostly to the general rules of “combined s tan d a rd ” , 
there is no question about the  general rules o f agreem ent and obligation 
draw ing a tten tion  in practice.
I t  was hardly possible to make an application to  them . Surely, the 
greater p a rt  of CLb.’s general force of contracts were not m eant for this. 
Before this, s ta tu tes had to be made suitable to  give support to the  mass 
production (mass turnover industry), and also to the  contracts of single
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settlem ents concerned great investm ents. Before discussing th a t, we 
have to  examine, how our civil-code after its m odification, is capable of 
accepting these contracts, and how much th e  general p a rt is prepared 
for the outcasted  standards of the  compulsory force of agreem ent to  be 
based upon, even to be possible if  they  stem  from national economy.
The codificational consequences o f the years of 1977 —78 could be 
sum m ed uj> in the  following. The standard  agreem ents of national eco­
nom y have gained their places in the  CL. (transport contracts ans m uni­
cipal services, chapter X X X IV . The undertaking [understanding by 
th a t  the contract of the  labour and m aterial of the  enterprises too], are 
denom inating separately, the building-contract, project-contract, in ­
stallation-contract, research-contract, and travel-contract, the XXXV. 
chapter of C. L.).
Bulk delivery of the agricultural produce contract, is also presented 
with a larger scale of codes as before. Between the individual contracts, 
rules such as bank and credit conditions are taking place, which typicaly 
refer to  the  emerging law conditions of economic organizations (C. L. 
chapter XLIV). The convencions of companies have been changed, a 
good deal of its concrete arrangem ents can be also applied to  the m anag­
ing corporations of economical bodies (C. L. chapter XLVI). I t  is by 
itse lf a significant measure. Even more im portan t as th a t is, the elim ina­
tion of the pld chapter XX XV, of which hase been already said, th a t it 
has presented the penurious unassum ing general parts of certain strongly 
standarnised, and a world closed in itself, treaties of national economy, 
under the nam e of plan-contracts.
The m ost significant codified result was undoughtedly the radical, 
resolute, well thought after, and on the whole, very successful transfor­
m ation of the general rules of agreements. Now, and now only, the gene­
ral p a rt of the contract law has became com petent to  embrace, and 
cherish the contracts of m anaging corporations. One can certainly argue 
abou t some of the new conventions (this tim e not however our aim) but 
the  whole composition can be regarded with a ttribu tion  of highest degree. 
Such a transform ation of the general rules of contract-law , opens a wide 
route of im plim entation to  the  “breaking out of standard  force” (be­
cause i t  is in vain for others to  say, th a t  i t  does not exists, i t  still exists) 
the  meaning of the contracts are being accomplished, which are suitable 
to  their common course, and the  so developed legal settlem ents — ac­
cording to  the new rules of the general p a rt — on the basis of the general 
compulsory force of contract too-, and not only, when they  f it  into the 
standard , could get court defence. Today it is only a possibility, and in 
all probability  far away too, b u t it  is a possibility.
W hat gives th is hope. How did it  possibly change, so much, im por­
ta n t  general part, the natu re  of the  general rules of contract. We should 
point a t  txvo phases. One falls on the law-policy, the other, on the field 
of action of the concrete codification. The decision of law-policy: the 
standard  agreem ents of economical organs do not form separata law- 
material. They do not in two meanings. They do not belong to a law sec-
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tion existing, or being due to  be established in the future, — economy- 
law-, b u t they  stay  w ithin the  civil-law, and even there they  do not live 
their way of life surrounded by glass sp in tered  lofty walls, a p a rt from 
the  rest of the contracts of the civil-law, bu t they  settle — keeping m any 
of their particu lar features — w ithin the  populous and gaudy fam ily 
of contracts in the civil-law. The codification had also a dual task. On 
one side to  demolish the  prcautionary  walls of certain contract of the 
national economy by m odifying more or less the separate rules of single 
contracts, th an  on the o ther side, th a t  was the harder bite, to  make the 
general rules of contract suitable for receiving the  standard  con tract of 
m anaging corporations, into the contract law, for also these agreem ents 
could, the  law -m aterial relating to the “contract", have as “background- 
law ”. On behalf of this, the rules had to be layd down, or assigned from 
sowhere else, which — commonly expressed — are suitable for largescale 
model.
This of being suitable, has a trip licate  critérium . A t first the general 
rules of contract should be qualified to  help the m ass-turover origining 
from m ass-production transacting (mass-contracts), secondly should 
be able to  transact the individual large-investm ents, and to  solve a c ti­
vities of very im portan t com plicated juristic  economical technical m a t­
ters (individual-contract), and finaly and th irly , to  compose those require­
m ents, dem anded of the  socialist economical organs, in the  fields of 
trade-life (for example co-operational contractual du ty  etc.).
I f  we experim ent, to  make a bunch of the  rules, serving th is treble 
target, we will not find it  difficult. Following the sequence of the  rules: 
w ithin the general rules of contract will be formed the co-operational lia­
bility, also required by contract signeing, (CLb. 205§ (3) sec.)]. Among 
the general rules we find the provisions, referents of the agreements, 
being induced on the liability  of treaties (CLb. 205. § (3) —(4) sec., CLb. 
206. § (1 )—(3) sec.), the invitation of tenders (212. §) the judicia l power to 
institute agreements, which on certain conditions bears on the establish­
m ent of the content of agreement, on its m odification, on its rescission 
and  cancelletion, and on keeping in force o f the  contract (CLb. 206. 
§.). We also m ention the new provision concerning the  representation 
of legal entity (CLb. 220. §).
The preliminary agreement (CLb. 208. §) can be applied prim arily 
to  the economic organizations, because from the ranges of these are 
chosen the signatories of agreement, who with a consideration of the 
unknown requirem ents, under their own names, and  of their own acco­
u n t are drawing up the contract, w ithout being able to sum  up  the un ­
known requirem ents exactly, or being able to influence these tendencies. 
The possibility of having the general reserves o f contract avoided by the 
law because of the contents of blanks, is a gratification of an old dem and 
aroused in the  firs t place by the activities of the economic organizations. 
(CLb. 209. §). W e can also include here: the 226. § ruling the  relation 
between the statutory law and the content of agreement, the paragraph 200 
of rescission, the general permission of the redressing o f voidness 237. §
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(2) sec., the settling of liability for breaking enforced contract 238. § (1) 
sec.
The safeguards of contract widened with bank assurances (CLb. 
249. §). The 4th section of 278. §, enclosed in the general rules of agree­
m ent, decides, where the  place of fulfilm ent is, if all parties are organiza­
tions o f the  economy. The 277. § is a new feature, which with positive 
orders settles the adequancy of services. The same paragraph, section 
(2) and (3) by the completion o f contract ordains the indispensable 
general, respectively particular co-operation.
To accept responsibility for breaking contract (security, w arranty) 
and the rules of responsibility (CLb. 305 — 311. §) (248. §), respectively 
300. § (3) sec., are pressing the  economic organizations to  complete to 
satisfaction and in tim e. Th former by pressure to  take  greater responsi­
bility o f redhibitory defects, the latter, in accordance with other rules 
o f liability- by sta ting  the compulsoiy undertaking o f additional tim e­
lim it, respectively urging the fulfilm ent in tim e, and to  keep the agree­
m ent within the lim its of possibility. We could mention the  CLb. 316 
§ (2) sec. too, which also gives an aid -to reasonable completion. The 
severance pay, and the minimised penalty s tipu lated  by the s ta tu to ry  
provision (CLb. 240. § (4) sec.) are justified  in the agreem ents of economic 
organizations. F inally the rule included in CLb. 314. § (2) sec. has an 
outstanding significance a t  the “reorganization” of s tandard  part, which 
states, “legal en tity  can not exclude, or restric t his responsibility for 
braking contract — unless othervise provided by s ta tu te  — except if  the 
disadvantage attached  to  it is being satified  through adequate reduction 
o f compensation, or by other preference” .
B ut why is so im portan t the general p a rt of the contract law, why 
do the general rules of agreem ent have such great significance ? Perhaps 
do we not overestim ate the im portance of genexal rules, in the circum ­
stances ol having quite a swarm  of s tandard  contracts standing a t  our 
disposal with ever increasing num ber.
Generally could be said, th a t  the Civil-Law book of any society, can 
not exist w ithout a well founded general pai-t of the  contract law. The 
conventions of individual contracts can not replace anywhere the rules 
o f “agreement", if  there is an advanced turnover co-operation and associa­
tive tendency among the economists.
“One can not dem and, th a t  a law-book should have a  literally 
definition of each transaction, which could appear bv turnovers. The 
code, th a t clearly defines th e  general principles required to decisions, and 
takes the whole context in to  account, deserves appreciations. Beside 
such an accom plishm ent m ost of the  questions could be easely answered, 
about which the  followers of casuists fretting  their heads and pens”, — 
writes von Tevenar (1783) the  provincial Prim e-m inister of Magdeburg, 
the head of one of the Codificational com m ittee, w.).
The rights and liabilities arousing by the individual kind of contracts, 
could be defined w ithout any difficoulty with the interposition of general
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principals of the law of treaties. Nevertheless for the benefit of the jurists 
just beginning to  excercise, to  make their work easier, and to  sharpen 
their power of judgem ent, we find it necessary to  insert some of reputed 
contracts in the Code”, m eant rreiller the father of the  old CL b.3
Developing the tra in  of the thoughts, he followed, the big b u t n a tu ­
rally difficoult a r t  of the legislative stands also a t  the question of giving 
neither too little  nor too m uch.4
We risk an evolving standpoin t aim ing even fu rther than  that: 
The greater is the increase of num bers by individual contracts and 
standard  contracts on the  codes, or rather, in the rules complem enting 
them , all the more increases the meaning of the  general conventions of 
agreements. This conclusion becomes im m ediately acceptable if we consi­
der, th a t  the variety  of contracts are com prehending always a sm aler 
range of the turnovers. I f  we do draw a parallel between the rules of 
trading and, lets say, of trawel contracts, we find, the first one is more 
common, than the o ther one.
The trading is — compared to  the general rules of agreem entless 
unusual as the traval contract. I t  also results, th a t the trad ing  -  m ost 
of the  rules of the genei-al part origining of its abstraction  — could ra ther 
dispense the standard  p a rt as the travel contract. The con tac t typs be­
coming always more specific are concentrating narrow ly a t  their own 
subject, because also of codifieational economics —. The legal m aterial 
aimes a t the narrow subject as a target. Becoming strongly special even 
itself. Nevertheless, between the narrow boardiers, there is the whole life 
present. During travel a num ber of such problèmes could arise, which 
can not be settled by s ta tu tes being concentred on the particu lar cir­
cumstances. We could say, if the complication beyond the  travel contract, 
bu t emerges during the journey, dowe not have to  cinsidet i t  ? Of course 
we do. However, since the rules of travel contract do not give answer 
to the “quid iu ris” we have to  apply to  the general conventions. An ex­
ample. The journey is by aeroplane. The passengers are  arriv ing a t  the 
wanted target. There each of the to their own pleasure, or perhaps orga­
nised, are spending the tim e. Almost everybody buys something. The 
day of retu rn  has come. The participants get on the plane, and  the plane 
s ta rts  off. The anxiety, custom ary by such ocasions, had  hardly gone by, 
when the stewardess, or the pilot of the plane gives the inform ation, th a t  
Budapest can not receive them , they have to land, m oreovar, a t an a ir ­
port of a country, where the aeroplane, under normal conditions would 
only fly across w ithout stopping. This is known to the local representa­
tive of the aircom pany. He turns up a t the a irport, where the emergency 
landing was indicated, and takes care of the passengers. The worthier 
agencies p u t the unfortunate passengers into tran sit hotels, the indifferen­
ter, and the  poorer p u t them  on the train . There is no appeal. The cus- 
tom free waintingroom  m ust be left, and the  land of the a irport has to 
be entered. A t the entrance are standing the  customs-officers of the 
“receiving coun try” and  let the passengers pass through the custom s 
(they have the righ t to  it, since they entered the country  concerned).
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Few of the passengers have purcheses, which in the country  they sta rted  
off are not falling under export-duty , and in H ungary there is not import- 
du ty  on them , bu t in the country of emergency landing are liable to 
duty . The passenger who entered the country  for reason beyond his 
control, e ither pays the high customs fee, (what is alm ost impossible, for 
the tu ris t in the rarest occasion have currancy) or have to  hand over the 
purchases being liable to  customs, to  the very polite, b u t nevertheless, 
firm  customs officer. Who will compensate the loss ? There is no pass 
of th a t  in the  travel contract. The fulfilling of com m itm ents, or responsi­
bility of aircompanies and travel agencies, include such damages ? By 
all means yes. Damage has happened, the reason to exclude illegality, 
does not exists, moreover, neither the air company, nor the travel agency 
proceeded with the care generally expected from them  in this particular 
case. B ut this dem and could only be based upon the 339. §, with the in ter­
position of CLb. 318. §, or upon other rules of the general part. The m odi­
fication, in the discussed manner, of the general p a rt of the contract- 
law, inclusive the general p a rt  of agreem ent, is a significant achievement, 
also as regards the international measures, weil the system atization of 
contracts of economic organizations, is not only a problem of Hungary, 
b u t a  problem of all o ther socialist countries.
The other range of definitive problems of the contractual system  is 
uptill today represents the system ization of contracts, signed" by the 
socialist organs among themselves. Gives proof to this the fact, th a t 
very different tackling of codifications arised in the europian socialist 
countries, the economical complete leagaly separation (Czeho-slovakia, 
German Dem ocratic Republic), plan contractual (inner) differentation 
(hungarian civil-law-book of 1959) and the aim ing a t  the homogeneity 
of system  (chiefly in the  Polish code of 1964).5
I t  is very likely, th a t these settlem ents are in accordance with the 
economical system functionable in the m entioned countries, conversely 
a system  of adm inistration control, based upon a m ethodical m arket 
influence, showing more orr less deviation, from theirs, -n my 
oppinion- has now found a resolution of turnover-law  by precisely 
setting  them  into the civil-law, and not for last by the reorganization 
of rules of the general contracts, and though the sequence of economy in 
the m entioned countries bears no resemblance to the hungarian codifi- 
cational accom plishments, merely from  the point of view — according 
to our observations — th a t  the contracts of national economy, could be 
well adapted to the contracts of the civil-law, only than, if  the contracts 
of general agreements also make allowances for the particular constitu ­
tional requests, system ising the  connections th a t  of turnovers and indi­
vidual, between the organizations of economy. The long and the short of 
it  is the following, the voulting point is the adaptation o f the general forces 
of contracts to the standards of massturnover.
A t the beginning of po in t (1) we have taken in stock the new regu­
lations — referring to our them e — the general parts of contract law. 
We shall now single out one, or two of them , regarded as more im portan t,
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and a l r e a d y  have some experience, and also have developed some theore­
tical argum ents, now we shall exam in them .
In  our modern age strikes us some of the new ways, and the s ta tu to ry  
provisions attached  to  them  of draw ing up contract. We are far away 
by m ost o f this contracts signeing from  the classical form, which accord­
ing to  the  m utual opinion of m any others, a contract comes in to  existence 
by m utual will of act, tending to  legal effect. How the  law, from  the 
dem and of actual will comes to  the point of no t claiming i t  any more by 
drawing up contract, is described in m any places by Eörsi.® The main 
stages of the route; a)  The dem and of genuin will, b) tru sting  the p rin ­
cipal of s ta tem en t forward, c) the s ta tem en t becomes fictitious, too d) 
the economical and legal coercions replaceing the will. I t  is a general 
tendency in the modern cap ita list’s, bu t in the  socialist s law too. B ut 
still the socialist jurisprudence dem ands a t  least the  fiction of will, the 
bourgois, firs t if  all the Scandinavian legal experts take in to  account, 
th a t  certain conducts are followed, by the fact of conduct itself, by such 
consequences, as there already was an  agreement of will.
“Vékâs writes: the  legal cosequence is being em phasised, regardless, 
i t  is in an ac t of (symbolised) verbal form, in operation, or in ou t of 
action .”7
Than he quotes Jörgensten: “when an a ttitu d e  arouses, which is 
norm aly used in connection of defined complexes, th an  these typical legal 
consequences usually set in by the ru le” .8 In  every con tract the  partip i- 
ans are “w anting” som ething, b u t it  is not a t  all sure, th a t  all happens 
the way they  -want i t  to  happen.
“Drawing up a contract is like pressing a bu tton , and as a result of 
this, appears a box. The box contains not only the will of the parti ci pants, 
b u t'm an y  o ther m atters as well. M atters in consequence of the  standard  
agreements the parties wanted, and also m atters they  did not, or one of 
them  did not w ant, (for example: the  objectively based in terp reta tion  of 
contract a ttache o ther meanings to  the expressions employd there, as 
the participants, or one of the participants. The rea lity  of agreem ent 
therefore, is not in co-ordination with the content of combined s ta te ­
m ents of the will. Pressing of the button did not result a “specific box”, 
b u t a tsandard  one corresponding best to  the purpose of the parties. 
Therefore, also the  court of justice takes the aim  of the participante, 
and the standard  agreable to it, into consideration. Makes an affort in 
the firs t place, to  identify  the agreem ent with a standard  already known, 
failing a t  th a t, makes an affort to  establish a new s tan d ard .” This has 
been quoted from Olivecrona.9
We could find  sim ilar thoughts in the hungarian civilistic: “I t  is 
not the  subjective will, b u t certain objective bases of the fact are those, 
to  which the  claims and their influences are a ttach ed .”10 Or the o ther 
one: Subjectivism  originates all the effects of con tract from the inner 
will of participants, based on the principal of the pacta  sun t servanda, 
which raises to  a legal axiom  the german proverb “ Des Menschen Wille
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ist rein H im m elreich” in the rights o f these people (by the  Romans, and 
by the  English, the explanation is from  me S. I.) is unknow n.11
Exists there in tlie rea lity  still a free contractual will, contractual 
freedom, and if there  is none, or have no im portance, w hat o ther factors 
are motiving the  being of turnovers, and w hat o ther factors determ ine 
the  contents of the  contract ? Further on we try  to  seek an answer to 
these, a t  first in general, th an  exam ining a few contracts of the econo­
mic organizations. As by o ther questions o f great consequences, we could 
not possibly give a definite yes, or no answer o f exists a freedom of 
contract there, or is there a free contractual will, and w hat the meaning 
of the will is, in the  world o f affairs o f civil rights. We could not even 
deelair the existence o f contractual freedom in some of the standard  
contracts, and, th a t the contract is completed according to the will of 
the two, or more participants, according to  the same will they have 
exrpessed, and in o ther contracts do not. All contracts have to contain 
some kind of contractual will. The free will, and the contractual will, 
does not sueced the sam e way everywhere, and the  content combination 
of the tex t differs also from the will of participants, in various contracts.
I t  can be undoughtedly sta ted , in the contracts o f the citizens with 
one and other, or ra ther in the contracts signed for the fulfilm ent of 
their personal needs, the contractual freedom succeeds in wide scale, 
bu t as we shall see not in the absolute meaning o f it. Tt is for the subject 
to decide; does he in tend to  sign a contract, with whom lie signes it, 
w hat the object is ot the contract. His contractual freedom is as far, as 
in a society founded on division o f labour, determ ined, he must sign cer­
tain agreements, to meet his needs. W'e can concerne this as general 
legitimacy. However, a fter the decision of the individual, wheather he 
want to  sign a contract In meet his concrete requirements, or not, factors 
intervene, already, restricting the  contractual freedom. To meet his 
needs, he could only tu rn  to  certain economic organizations, for the eco­
nomic organizations have monopoly in the d istric t, or in the whole 
country. He ha perhaps so much possibility, to  choose an other brach of 
the same enterprise, if he is not satisfied with the purchases, or services 
of the form er one. B ut if lie does go to  an o ther one, the term s he finds 
there, are nevertheless the same. The righ t to  choose the  partner is, — to 
meet their personal requirem ents, the citizens, in contracts entering 
with economic organizations, — however, in most of the  case is only an 
illusion. \ \  h a t about the object of the contract, does i t  reallv tu rns out 
the way the individual wants it, or the way flic two partnera freely 
agree on. N ot a t  all, happenes like tha t.
In  certain cases the object of contract can not be choosed any more 
either, perhaps in general, because the factors of quan tity , bu t iii most 
cases the factors of quality  are specified by the economic organizations. 
Exam ple; loday  is someone goes to a restau ran t of public catering to 
have lunch, he does not have w hat lie wants, but what there is to have. 
Only through faded remembrances, and from recounts of elderly people, 
knows the generation of today, th a t there was a tim e, when a keeper of
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a restau ran t (inn-keeper), lias made the most loved meal of the dear 
guest, and prepared the way he wanted it. I oday the  menu decides it. 
I f  i t  includes the favourite meal of the dear guest, he can have it, if it 
does not, th an  good-bye. The consumation. and also the guest are both 
m anipulated today. They are m anipulated in the  service o f vavourable 
transaction  of m ass-turnover, and standardisations established by the 
economic organizations.
In  o ther cases the tim e of fulfilment does not depend on him. 11 
someone buys a  car over here, — this serves also as supply ol needs — 
the saler a monopol organization, (which has been wrongly placed in 
the position of being the  monopol saler of used cars, instead making 
efforts to  detect the singular abuses) sets onesidedly, the day o f deli­
very. I t  is a luck, if th a t  is kept.
Гп the measures of counterservices, again, in m ost o f the cases, t here 
is no argum ent. The prises are though officially fixed prices, or are Irom- 
to prises, bu t even there, the concrete prises are not settled by corres­
pondance of wills, bu t by the enterprise, which regulates the daily, 
weekly or monthly prises.
The term s of paym ents do not represent either, a m atte r of dealing 
— it has a  meaning a t  buying on hire-purchase — or the m utual will, 
they  are already there, set. The purchaser lays down x am ount ol money 
bv the signing o f the agreement, the rest of the  prise has to be payd on 
the term s of the very enterprise, or on th e  term s of the organization, 
who gave the  credit (ÖTP.). The one they m ake exeption with, is a friend 
of God.
The place of fulfilm ent is also determ ined by the firm. In  case ol 
articles in daily use, is usually the company, shops, or stores of the  en te r­
prises. The shop-assistant is rehaps prepared to  undertake the arrange­
m ent for delivery by reason of instruction (furniture purchase).
B ut the  responsibility for the loss, or damage of the furniture, does 
no t concerns him anymore. The shop-assistant by  handing the  purchase, 
from  the shop, or store over to the customer, has finished his task. Only 
a few of the  provision companies are offering home-delivery for custo­
mer, on purchases have been ordered by them , but lately, the numbei 
of those few are decreasing.
Singleing ou t one of the closer m ethods of fulfilm ent, the packing oi 
the  goods is there, regardless of it is for next door, or being taken  hundred 
kilom ter away. Most of the goods are packed beforehand in certain 
quantities the custom er can not dem and to have them  weight again. 
From the  examples we sta ted  above is to be seen, th a t  the contractual 
freedom consumer and economic organizations is a t its m inimum, and 
the object of it no t a t all depens on the will of agreem ent. There emerge 
the s itua tion , described by Eörsi: “The exchange of goods can lead to  
an agreem net even if there is no contractual freedom, if the will is fic­
tive ...........provided, th a t the form  of agreem netis there (the ita lic  is
m in e ’ s . I .)”12
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Following necessarily the technical developm ent is the “restric tion” 
of the contractual freedom, — and because of the contractual freedom 
itself has no w ert of positive, or negative — the restriction of it deserves 
neither tears, nor anger”.13 Eörsi does not na tu ra lly  submisse to  the 
re s tiiction on any account, and lashes all the solutions which are pro­
duced b \  the capitalist regime, and w hat against the hum anitarian re­
presentatives of jurisprudence are also raising their voices. He objects to 
the one-sided conditions of the “adhesive” , the “blanks”, the “d ic ta ted”, 
to  the abuse of distortion , and against efforts of the enterprises such 
as adjusting not through public chanels” their economical relations. 
He condemns the practice, w hat is used as a fundam ent by the “mights 
of economy , w ith a reference to the contractual freedom, and ceasing 
th a t  contractual freedom by the very party  they  sign an agreem ent 
with the large enterprizes are possesing a “quasi-legislativ power” , and 
also, tha t the juristic  super superiority’ originating from economical 
superiority, even in the case of legal proceeding makes the situation 
hopeless for the signatory, in the contract with large enterprises, than  he 
remarkes: these formations are therefore necessarily established by mass-
turnover, and m ass - b и is n esses : m utatis m utandis come in to  existence in 
socialist relations too.14 We follow here the mental process. I f  the re­
striction of contractual freedom “m utatis m utandis” exists also in soci­
alism — we only m ention here the contractual freedom of the eitizens- 
then also m utatis m utandis existing the origins of restrictions. Some 
of them  are the same as by the capitalists, the others are resulting from 
the contem porary, the existing, in H ungary existing circumstances. I t  
happenes m utatis m utandis th a t these restrictions really do not de­
serve tears, or anger, b u t there are such cases aswell, which deserve not 
only tears, b u t screams, and in the scholar give a rise to a desperate 
angei for the alteration, being anxious about the human. I t  were sheer 
madness to raise a voice against standardisation, against the blanks, for 
they make the signing of contract easier, and also against the monopol 
situation, which brings the  turnover up-to-date, but one can not resign 
to everything. N either in the socialism, nor for the supporters of soci­
alism. The technical developm ent carries always a large am ount of 
danger with itself, and it will be the same in the fu tu re  too. The danger, 
are coming on one side from the technique itself, (risks of accident, en- 
vironm ental vitiation, the extortion, or squandering of manpower), on 
the o ther hand from its social consequences (economical overpower- 
exploitation of monopol situation, legal superiority, onesidedly favourab­
le specifications, and m anipulation of consumer). \\ ha t ever had happe­
ned to the hum anity, if everybody always sees only the advantages, and 
do not notice the disadvantages as well. \\  h a t ever will be of socialism, 
if we in the rave of “modern technique” do not notice its natural, econo­
mical, social and within th a t, legal deleterious effects. There exists a 
free pass though, bu t it originates also from the socialism of today. From 
t he fact, th a t the countries of present socialism, in serving the consumers 
are behind in m any ways of the fully, or average advanced countries
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of capitalism , and th a t  it makes us inclined, to  adore the  results, still in 
the race of catching up, regardless how they  arise. B ut we have to race 
our voice in the in terest of present and future, againts the “in ju ries” 
both, th a t  of technique to  nature, and to  society. To retu rn  to  the re­
striction  of contractual freedom, we shed tears a t, and be angry with 
such restrictios, which derives from  creating artificially  monopol s itu a ­
tions, — by s ta te  — which do not even serve the developm ent of produc­
tion  or return , th a t  th e  assortm ent is too little , — though i t  could be 
bigger — th a t  the  enterprises are m anipulating the  consumer, — to 
keep an eye on their business interests, and often merely of leisure —, 
they  take the money from  the custom er in a promisse of uncertain  deli­
very, — merely because of national interests — th a t  in the in terest of 
establishm ent of really necessary situations in the  d istan t fu ture, re­
stricting  now the turnovers of certain possessions (estate), to  provoke 
the  worker to  distored consum ption, to  use the  law amiss also by  neces­
sary  conclusions — because of the sta te  does not know the influence 
mechanism of the law-, also th a t in the case of fixed prices i t  is the com­
pany, who dictates the  concrete prices, — and against th a t, as last mean 
could be officially in tervened only in case of m aking inscrupulous pro­
f it — , because of the failing of healthy com petition, which could result 
no t only the  increase of prices, b u t also the  decrease of them , — th a t  
the increase of prices practically are always affecting the goods dem anded 
by pretentious customers-, and the official corporations for fixing the 
prises do not notice, or do not w ant to notice th a t  the  goods w ith e x t­
reme low price level (bread, bakery, flower) are waistfully consumed 
by all levels of the society-, also w hat is lost on the  swing, is made up ot 
the rounds, the undertaking, the retailer, and  often the  sales assistan t 
too are in the possition to  make an artificial shortage, and to  dem aud on 
the top  of the  price slipping-m oney, and so on. The contractual fredom 
in some cases is of great value, and should be looked after. I t  is not 
enough only to  declair it, b u t something should be done about i t  too. 
The environm ental atm osphere of economy should be in certain  cases 
groundly changed, to give chance to  customer to  choose in enterprise, 
purchases and in agreements, to be able to partic ipa te  his will, derived 
from his in terest in the content of the agreement, not to  be the puppet, 
on the string of, into m onotony crippled, large m anipulators. I t  is a vain 
illusion — and a needless effort — to trouble oneself for the re-establish­
ing of the classical freedom of contract, bu t it  is no t a don Quixote like 
eagerness towards the consumer’s free will to  be able to  succed in larger 
scale.
There are such field of technical developments, which offers quite 
new foundations to  the  establishm ent o f the contract, m oreover in mass 
and th is process spreads. We th ink  now of the autom ats, which are eject­
ing foodstuffs, if  the custom er inserts money, we th ink  now of the  con­
ductor-free vehicles of the  city traffic transport services, and if  the passen­
ger gets on to it, then  comes an agreement into force between the  passen­
ger and the transport company, now we th ink  of the  parking of a car
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in a  parkingplace, where one has to  pay for th a t  piece o f road but the 
car will not be looked after, and the self-serving stores, where, by the 
taking of tha  goods from the shelves, developes the situation equal to 
agreem ent, the establishing ol a contract does not need any pronounce­
m ent of will, t he fact itself brings i t  to  operation, and  the form ating of 
its content, has nothing to  do with the  signatory. G etting so far, we pu t 
the question, — to keep an eye also on the contracts of the economic 
organizations signed w ith each other, than  we p u t i t  again —, if  the will 
of the parties, or one of the parties do not prevail, what is the security 
of, this contract is being the  righ t one for the benefit o f the sharers ?
The signification of the agreem ent increase in the contacts of eco­
nomic organizatios. Since ”he reforming of the nomical mechanism, a 
change has entered in its role, w hat could also be nicknam ed 
as determ ent, in two directions, a t  first, the contract is no t a 
simple plan enymore, broken down by the control of adm inistration, 
and as naturalness compulsory to  the organizations, as the  shell of civil- 
law, b u t it has an “individual life” and  is th  agreem ent-stock of the en ter­
prises. this could serve also as the  base o f enterprise-planning. Secondly, 
these changes have to the  agreem ent itself, im portan t consequences. 
\\ ide-known works have dealt with the modified role o f the agreements, 
also with the transform ation of them , therefore we neglect to  analyse 
it in detail, ra ther calling atten tion  to  the novelty, experienced recently, 
before all. by the m odification of the civil-law book, and by the new 
sta tu to ry  provisions brought forth in connection with the modification, 
respectively by their application in the  practice. M ust be m entioned -  we 
th ink  so —, the effect produced on contract by the functions of the  agree­
ment, the significance o f the contractual will, and the m ultiplication of 
the  species bv the agreements.
Contracts signed between the economic organizations with regards 
to the role they play in the broader meaning o f turnover, we can devide 
them  into two large groups. Classifying into the first one, the mass- 
turnover, (of buy and sale character), and into the  second group, the 
agreements, for the developm ent o f im portan t individual projects, and 
also of o ther contracts tending to settlem ents of individual nature, of 
complicated, fu lly  activated economical functions (of tackle, and partners­
hip character). The contracts belonging to  the first group, are serving 
the intersections of repeated transactions o f standardised mass-produc­
tions. The partners usually, are in constant touch since a longer periode 
with each-other, and the objects, and the contents of the from tim e to 
tim e renewed agreemets, have become stabilised. They define the ser­
vices specifically (of closed race kind). The constancy gives a pissibility 
to  use blanks a t the agreements, -  by standard  cases — the simple 
acceptance of the blank-offers (order), the contract (sending it back 
signed) is completed (transport agreement, sale of consum article agree­
ment). But reversely, the contracts signed by economic organizations, 
the contracts belonging to the second group, the eliant there have no 
perm anent connections, or though perm anent, bu t each contract refers to
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a  setting  up of always deifferent objects, (the com pany’s corporative, 
tbe sharers of agreem ents with different co-operational tendencies, are 
m eeting each-other for the first tim e at the preparation and the comple­
tion of the  contract, the investors, who are perhaps connected for deca­
des now with the sam e executor, and projector, but each o f the contracts 
tend  to a different service).
As a result of this, the  content of the agreem ents has not been 
stabilised, and by each contract -  in spite of certain  constan t 
elem ents -  i t  m ust be prepared and discussed again, and again. 
The objects and the activ ities aiding the fulfilm ent of the agrém ent, cas 
ae though stabilised, (such as buildin elements in building-eontract/n 
machines, production-lines in the contracts of technological installations, 
bnd  certain actions in plancontracts), but result always in an  individua, 
procvdtion, a result, could not be called in to  eqistence, w ith just any  kind 
of ac tiv ity . The characteristics of these contracts are eqactly, th a t  
com plicated economical activities with great im portance are being 
developed by the (technical, economical, economical estim ations, ,cence, 
konow how, and o ther kind of economical, technical, transm ission of 
kowledges etc.). Tt is impossible to standardise the contractual conditions 
because ofethe variety  and perpleqitv of them , and also the agreement 
can no t be completed by simply accepting the offer, the order, the con t­
ract-plan, or by aknowledging, signing and  returing  it. These contracts 
no mass-agrements, bu t th ay  are „singular” , occasional", anh they 
could originate, and have originated —as we shall later point it  ou t — 
agreements of ,,self adjusting” , and ,.out of law"--, I he contractual act 
of will —closer, the w ill— have a different role a t the  agreem ents bv 
„ s tan d ard ” reserve, and a different one by the indivisual „sel-adjusting 
ones. We could not angularly Say, th a t  the will of the cliant, or any of 
the  chants, plays no part by the  standardised reserves, and by the indi­
vidual contracts they do. The tru th  is in between.
The role of the standardised reserves — if we grasp them  at their 
original s ta te  — is there to  sim plify the drawing up o f a contract. The 
enterprise w ith a  tu rn -ou t of m ass-production, services, and assurances, 
through the help of their own produced blanks, and  general term s of 
business1®, informes the cliant who wants to, or has to sign an agreem ent 
with a standing device, about the main conditions pertinen t to  the con­
ten t of the agreement, which they wish to  use as the condition of en te r­
ing into contract. I f  they  are disclosed by blanks, — and  the  cliant 
sends it  back signed to the o ther party  - ,  it stands for an offer, a fte r a 
simple consignation — when it comes to force — the  con tract by form 
too, is established according to the  blanks. But the eliants have the oppor­
tun ity  to  leave off some of the conditions, or to  change them , or to  a lter 
the general contractual conditions. In  theory the w ritten genei-al con­
trac tual conditions have the meaning of such d raft of contract which 
serve as a base of negotiation, and which contains m any im portan t ele­
m ents of the contract “prefabricated”. The custom ary conten t of a 
blank, is the definition of services with quality  indexes, a reference to
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co-operational liability  (perhaps to  the concrete liabilities of the em itter 
of blaks too) further, clauses regarding the completion and the braking 
of contract. The general contractual reserves do not contain the name 
of cliant (or ra ther one of the chants), the definition of quan tity  and 
assortm ent of services, the tim e and scheduling o f fulfilm ent. In  the agree­
m ent above the forw ritten tex t, the cliants can specify the concrete form 
of co-operation, the exchangevalue, respectively the ways of settling 
the exchange-value. I f  the blank is of aid  to signing the contract, — and 
has no o ther in ten tion  situa ted  behind — the cliants can discuss about 
the  forw ritten tex t too, and can agree by their own consent of will in 
the conditions the blanks do not contain. Simplified the  cliant can alter 
the general conditions, and they form the elements of contract no t w rit­
ten  there, according to  their own decisions. The situation  is different, if 
the editor of the general conditions of contract w ants to  apply pressure 
to  the cliant by specifying onesided advantages, which could come to 
such mesures, to  oust the  partner of the m arket, for being unable to 
undertake them . The possibility of defence against such afforts falls 
outside the contract signing, and  out of the home-affairs of the client 
becomes a public-affair, the s ta te  with the aid of law — perhaps also by 
devices outside the lawstops, or try  to  stop the misuse of economical 
superiority. The for this pupose available civil-law devices will be m enti­
oned in section. 3.
The other group of specified contracts are based on the “general 
business terms”. In  its form  is usually detached from  the regulations of 
agreem ents implied to  the “general business conditions”. The rules of 
“general business conditions” are the “business regulations” becoming 
the content of the  contract from  outside. The signatory of a contract, 
signed with the editor o f business regulations, — whether knows about it, 
or no tm ust subm it to  the rules of business conditions. In  this range there 
is no place for argum ent, bargin, m odification, leave, or exchange. In  
our country “the general business conditions”, the “business regula­
tions ’ are approved by the supervising au tho rity  of the em itting party . 
The approval is an act of the sta te . Even than , if  the business regulation 
does not become a s ta tue  with the approval, (as w ith the  approval does 
not become the constitutions of co-operative either), b u t the approval 
gives nevertheless an adequate norm ative strength  to  it  all, not to be 
able to depart from  its rules for either the om itter, nor for the other 
p a rty  entering into contract.
I f  there exists a business regulation, it  is profitless for the other party  
to complain, lor it is only possible, an adéquat to the regulation, contract 
to be signed. Beside the business regulations, actually  the p a rty ’s will 
of ac t has not much to  do about the origination of the contract. In  con­
trac t with the owner of business regulation, the cliant decides really 
only about (if the signing of the contract is no t compulsory, in cases, 
such as vehicle, and shooting guaran ty  insurance), of signing the con­
trac t, or no t signing it. The will and the ac t of will have a role v irtually  
by the contracts based on business regulations (for example life insu-
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ranсe) only to decide the sequence of the  im portance o f contraservices, 
the  tim e, and m éthodes of delivery, for the  agreem ents are again lim ited 
by the “business regulations” .
However, the circum stances, established by the application of 
general conditions, or by business regulations, are qualified as a contract, 
because the  agreem ent in  its  fu ture  existence will take  a route, as if  i t  
were originated by the “two or more sided legalv affected unanim ous 
ac t of will” (classical form).
The contracts of “indiv idual” , “incidental”, “selfadjusting” , often 
“ou t of law ”, are offering a considerably bigger p a rt to the  will of act.
“In  the case of “involved individual” contracts, the  “selfad justing” 
generally is so complete, i t  entirely  fades the  role of s ta tu to ry  law, p rac­
tically lim iting it only to  respect the cogent prohibitory  signes.
.................... the contracting parties, in alm ost all the  cases have
full disposal of the  possible consequences of their legal relationship.
....................The comprehensive, intensive co-operation is often mo­
tiva ted  also by the fact, th a t  legal relations of such kind — because of 
the  com plexity of services, deviarication o f laws and duties-, do no t fall 
w ithin the standards of provision, b u t they are of miscellaneous, or in 
fact atypical n a tu re” writes Vékâs.17
The selfadjusting character in cases of “individual” , and “inciden­
ta l” contracts, presents itse lf by institu ting  the contracts, really the 
cliants themselves. The result of their agreem ent is — sometim es am oun­
ting to  volumes — virtually  every single word o f the contract. They set 
by, the dispositive rules, they  pass the lim its of standard , they  s tipu late  
the  fulfilm ents and conditions, the afterm ath  of con tract breach, and 
often the  special ways of settling  issues. Vékâs explains it  in general, 
why is th is possible.
....................B y most of the  cases of selfadjusting contracts, — from
the point of view of either the economic power, or the juristic  erudition 
— principally balanced partners with m utual, or sim ilar prospects, are 
facing each-other”18. The observations in our country indicate the  same, 
still we have to  make two small corrections to  the  generaly righ t fac t­
finding of Vékâs. The first correction: in the  “individual contracts for 
investm ents a t  home, though the  partners in opposition have the  same, 
or sim ilar economical, and also juristic  eruditional power, are no equal 
partners, because of the alarm ing shortage of investm ent goobs, and 
capacity. Even by the contracts of buildingm aterial trade and commerce, 
because of the shortage of investm ents and the lack of capacity , the  
constructor prevails over, and the investor can do nothing, b u t to  acco­
modate. The second correction: i t  may be, th a t  the  two, or more, equal 
in power, partners can not prevail over each-other, therefore the  bindung 
is correct, however to  make use of the  result, the produce of the  contract, 
in m any cases are elements, (for example organizations financed by the 
s ta te  budget, individuals), inferior to  them ., (the premises of the univer­
sity  were build on the  base of a contract, which have been signed be t­
ween investor and constractor, both quite indipendent of the university ,
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or like the  home of the indificual, who gets it a fter a long, nerve-racking, 
life-shortener waiting, and heavy expenditure). The correctness of large 
investors tow ards eachother sometim es goes (decline) so far, th a t they 
un ite  their in terests against the  custom er, and the consum er.19
This correctness on account of the  th ird  party , hardly could be 
“rew arded” by the law. W e shall re tu rn  to these problems. In  the classical 
capitalism , the  contract has been in itia ted  to  a weapon of services o f the 
legal arsenal of turnover, by the fact, th a t  to the accom plishm ent of it 
needed the act of will, indipendently  established by two, or more produc- 
tional, (productional-consum er), legaly free, from  one another economi- 
caly indipendent, depending on each-other only by the  division o f labour. 
The freely contracting parties with their justice sta tem ents have aided, 
to  serve their own interests. Even, if they  involved tem porary  risks, 
they  were awere of this, it  has been made in the expectation of higher 
profit. The equal po ten tia lity  of parties have precluded the possibility, 
to  prevail over each-other. The u-ill contract iras the security of ehe ring 
equal advantages and setbacks in the contract. The role o f will and  agree­
m ent, as we described i t  up till now, have faded, and  than  became unne- 
cessery a t  contract signing. The role of the will though has not fully 
expired, bu t does not rule the liability  as far, as it  did before. The parties 
in m any cases, either in economical power, or in juristic  erudition are 
not on equal term s. U nder these conditions, even the freedom of contract, 
and the will of contract have lead to  the spell-bound of the infirmer, up 
to  a degree o f having it be driven out of the m arket. The world have 
changed a lot.
In capitalism  though have no t ceased the  rivalité  among the en ter­
prises with sim ilar functions, the  struc tu re  of enterprise have so altered, 
the circum stances have so changed, th a t  the target has become not so 
much to spell-bound the rival, -  with them  is possible to agree -  but 
trough drawing up contracts with customers, or contractors in power 
inferior to them , to  gain a  p rofit in the  economical existence, bv those 
economic organizations, are qualified o f doing it. I f  the contract, which 
only contains the will o f one party , in words, w ritten , on blanks, in gene­
ral business conditions, feeding in autom ats, or manifesting in o ther 
distortions, grown on the weedy fields of economical difficulties, is not 
capable to keep all viable branches on the m arket, or to defend the cu ­
stom er, or to protect the m ight be, bu t in power inferior party  from the 
stronger other mighties, the s ta te  and the law enter by force into the 
private life of the parties, to  defend both or one of them , against them ­
selves, and against the o ther one. Since these objectionalbe phenomenons 
m utatis m utandis, can also occur in socialist relation — it showed by 
w hat was said — and the speading ol them  is undesirable for either the 
individual, or the society, лее are searching an answer to  a kind of legal 
means, to  keep the up-to-date contract as such institu te, where the parties 
are equal, and can equaly serve the interests the both  of them.
U ndoubtedly, the free will is generally the unsuitable way (it does 
not mean, th a t  it  has no significance, and no t to  be kept, on the contrary,
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fortifying, widening it, where it  can function in effect) for it  plays no 
role in th e  effectuation o f m any contracts, and  where i t  possible is, could 
give a rise to the contrary , as it has been created for, by forcing the will 
of one party  over the o ther one.
This situation  gives a new tasc to  the judge, to  the legilsator, and 
also to the  jurisprudence. Now the judge has to  inquire no t so much — 
though in the absolute meaning o f i t  he can never disregard i t  — w hether 
the contract is in accordance w ith the will of the  parties, b u t whether 
the con tract is a  righteous one. The legislator is doing his job well, if  he 
gives protection not only against the  will in con tract w ith in  the  range of 
classical reason for abate, b u t on one side by m ultiplying them , on the 
o ther side w ith o ther means relating to  law, (for exam ple penalty  on 
economy), by positively specifying the content of each contract, re­
spectively by p u tting  up new prohibitory signes to  promote, the  estab ­
lishm ent of righteous contracts. The jurisprudence has to  try  to  “reno­
v a te” the  old devices collestion, for also the  conventional devices to  be 
able to  enter the list in the in terest of new tendencies, and has to  search 
new tendencies to secure righteousness of contract. The idea of the  righ te ­
ousness of contract, first emerged in the bourgois jurisprudence. This is 
an idea, in my opinion, w hat the  socialist law can also p rofitab ly  employ. 
The equitableness of contract equally prom ote the  interests of parties 
in legal relation, — regardless, how th a t s ituation  came in to  existence, 
which lead to  legal consequences —. The criterion o f righteousness is the 
equal serving of interests. The righteousness is a  dem and of con tract 
between partners in their relationship. The socialism however, can not be 
satisfied w ith the success of th is dem and. Therefore, beside the righ te­
ousness as a dem and set tow ards the contract, m ust place an  o ther one, 
the  dem and of social usefulness. B ut this dem and should be placed in 
the firs t rate , or only, in the  relationship to one another of economic orga­
nizations. Fron the individual could only be expected, not to  contravene 
the  inhibitions, i t  would be an absurdity  and unnecessery, uncontroll­
able, superfluous dem and, for them  to  th ink by their each contract, of 
its social usefulness.
An allowance for social usefulness however, could be righ tly  ex­
pected of the economic organizations. For example, from the enterprise 
of building-m aterial trade, it is only fair to expect before draw ing up  a 
contract, to  gather inform ation from the party  passing the  order, of 
w hat they  do w ant the  building-m aterial for, w hether they  w ant to 
contract for stockpiling, or to fill their actual needs. A fter these inquires 
the orders can be sorted out, to  p u t the  ones, who w ant to  order for needs 
to  be filled, in front of the ones, who wants it  for stock-piling only. B ut 
because of the undertaking of m aterial supplier trade  is no t a controller 
of its customers, this dem and could only be established, if the  custom ers 
are “o u trig h t” too w ith the contractor. This solution, even if  i t  is more d if­
ficult, could lead to  a be tte r result, as the now existing, which shifts the  
responsibility of d istribution to the court of justice. The undertak ing  has 
the possibility of this, on the  base of the CLb. 206.§ (1) sec. . The court
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o f justice in the lawsuit of civil case (economical) could inquire the social 
profitableness of contract, and could sta te , th a t  the con tract is against 
the  C'Lb. 200. § (2) section, inevitably is contrary  to the social interests, 
therefore is null and void, th a t  the undertaking did not sign an agree­
m ent, because of the realisation o f such, would be obviously against the 
in terests of national economy, or the parties did not keep the rules of 
C'Lb. 4, § (1) —(3) sec., or have contravened the C'Lb. 4. § (2) prohibitive 
rule, respectively, have not fiven evidence of a ttitu d e  corresponding 
with the CLb. 205. § (3) sec. or ra ther 277. § (2) sec. s ta ted  rules.
The rightousness and the social profitableness o f Ihe contract are the two 
turnpo in ts, which could secure the contract its function properly to fulfil.
A part from the court of justice, the  controling authorities too, 
should have a greater care abou t the contracts of undertakings belong­
ing under their supervision. In  the  past, — when the content of a few 
blanks have become compulsorillv the content of the  contract —, we 
could experinece often, th a t the controling au thorities have the contrac­
tual prim ary conditions of blanks approved by them , their onesidedlv 
profitable, or onesidedlv disadvantageous conditions aknowleged w it­
hou t turning a hair, for the reason of no t knowing anything about it, or 
the  concerne a ttitu d e  lively living a t  th a t  tim e by the governmental 
offices. Both of them  are calam itous errors. The la tte r one we can catch 
in the act, sometimes even today. I t  were tim e to exchange the a ttitu d e  
of sectorial and suprvisory to  a ttitu d e  of national economy. . The super­
visory au tho rity  has milions of devices a t  disposal, to  press the economic 
organizations under its control, to the in itia tion  of ju s t  and socialy eco­
nomical contracts. Such an aim , combined with the consumer’s defence, 
could come to an adequate result.
3. As for the civil-law on the  grade of codes, or o ther legal conven­
tions has done already a lot to  prepare adéquat stipulations for the in 
circum stances altered contracts. The devices are for the purpose of both, 
in the stages of before signing, or ra ther under the signing, an d in  the sit n a ­
tion after the signing to  secure the contracts to be righteous, and socialy 
economical. The instrum ents for the pupose.
a)  S tating the establishm ent of contractual liability  w ithin the 
general rules of contract.
b) Making universal the  co-operational liability.
c) The definition by legal measures the content of contract.
d) The definition of the minimal content of contract, in the interesse 
of consumer, respectively in the interesse of the economically infirmer.
e) The restriction of laying aside the dispositive rules.
f )  To give possibility to  action for avoidance a t  the reserves of 
contract.
g) To enlarge the cicle of instances, in which the court of law can 
verify the content, rectifying it, or keep the  contract in force.
h) to  enlarge the instances of invalidity.
i )  to readjust the redressing of invalidity , and o f invalid  in parts.
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The decreem ent of contractual liability has two reasons. The reasons 
in  general, are to  increase the  defendance o f custom er in the  w idest 
in terp reted  meaning of it. A curious occurance in the  com petition can 
be observed, in socialist relations. The undertakings do not contend 
with rivals, the undertakings with sim ilar profil, bu t w ith the consumer, 
or rather, w ith the  economically less powered, or w ith the  consumers of 
otherwise in  economy more disadvantageously situated , and they  try  to  
get advantages by setting  onesided conditions. Com petition exists then, 
bu t it  is a distorted  com petition. The o ther reason is certain shortage 
o f assets — in  the first place, the assets of investm ents —. The protection 
against the d istorted  com petition makes th e  contractual liability  justi- 
fied, — i t  were unnecessery if  there was a real com petition —. This is 
namely, the possibility to prevent, th a t an undertaking in monopol 
situation , or otherwise more powered economically, the in th e ir oppinion 
“unm anagable” custom er, or transporter, to  exclude from  the m arket, or 
bring them  in a  disadvantegous situation there. The legislation has 
recognised rightly, th a t the possibility o f driving out, or setting  back 
of the o ther party , originating from not the  contractual, (accordingly 
w hether i t  is a transporter, or a customer), b u t from the economical 
position. A djusting to  th a t, sta rting  off from the standard , on the m arket 
of industial products is the transporter, and on the m arket, agricultural 
mass-produce, the customer is bound to  draw  up  a contract, respectively 
to  overtake the  whole of the  quan tity , offered by the producer. The 
liab ility  o f signing a contract m ust be also institu ted , because of the 
shortage o f certain  assets, for it  is the only hope to also to  produce articles 
of m ain profil by certain enterprises, among them  the not profitables 
too, (this would also not be necessery, if the prise and income policy had a 
firm er scientical basis), or ra ther to have from certain products, to  get 
in the first place, where by the society is be tter needed as somewhere 
else, (investm ent devices) and finaly for the individual custom er always 
to get products indispensably needed to  cover their needs, (arm ed corpo­
rations). The following provisions of the CLb. are containing the detailed 
rules: “The provision of law can m ake the draw ing up  of a contract com ­
pulsory” (CLb. 108: § (2) sec. The liability  and w arran t tending to service 
by legal measures, and by orders of the  au thorities can be due, w ithout 
contracting” (rare occasion) CLb. 198. § (3) sec. “The provision of law 
canmake the prelim inary contract compulsory” (CLb. 208. (2) sec. To 
prolong to the breaking point, or to bring about the failure o f a contract 
is impossible by m aking statem ents diversely to  the  tender, or by gush 
of answeres” . “In  the case of liability  of contract signing, if the parties 
do no t agree with each-other, the contract can be effectuated also by the  
court of law, and can s ta te  the content of i t ”. CLb. 206. § (1) sec. can 
supplem ent the non essential, insufficiency CLb. 206. § (4), can establishe 
the prelim inary contract and on the basis of prelim inary contract also 
the contract. CLb. 208. § (3) sec. and (4) sec. The provision of law 
empower the court of justice (CLb. 230. § (3) sec. to establish the content 
of agreement in case of litigation of no t valid contracts, respectively to
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establish, the contract between the parties. And finally: In  the case of 
cancellation of a long existing connection of productive, co-operational, 
and com m ertial connection — unless otherwise provided by s ta tu te  — 
the court of law, in the light o f in te rst o f the social economy, and of the 
apprecialbe interest, can for a definite periode, establish the contract. 
(CLb. 206. § (3) sec. By the lack o f contract, in practice, the court of 
law can only, by the  wish of the custom er, establish a  contract, — the 
transporter consequently can not foist in the potential custom er, the 
poor, unuseable, or regardless of the needs produced products. Even the 
breaking of a lengthy connection, could only in case of request by the 
custom er, leed to  juridical contracting. Now, the (.’Lb. 206. § (3) and the 
s ta tu to ry  provisions, containing the detailed rules of economic organiza­
tions, do not have such restrictions. I t  is likely, that by the breaking of a 
longer contract, the reason to establish a contract, in practice, if the sub­
ject m atter of it  serves certain industrial products, will be on the request 
of the custom er, and in case o f agricultural produce, on the request of 
the supplier. The sta tu ro ry  law by the instances of delivery-contracts, 
offers a  large scale of authorizations to juridical interventions, for ex­
ample, the q u an tity  of the p a rt  com pletion can be decided bv the  court 
of justice, if the parties did not stipu late  in the  m atter, or the stipulation 
is non unam biguous (CLb. 380. §). The modified CLb., in more o f its 
p a rts  rules the co-operational liability, in the 4. § (3) sec. co-operation in 
general, in the 205. § (3) sec. co-operating by the signing of the contract, 
and  in the 277. § (3) section co-operating in  the ranges of fulfilment. The 
co-operation is one o f the requirem ents of functional and bona fide legal 
practice, and o f obligational fulfilm ent, in situations where it  is needed. 
The contractual relations are of this kind. A fter entering the co-operatio­
nal liability  in to  the general rules of agreem ent, there is no need to 
m ention i t  again, by any kind of contract typ . This rule stands for all 
contracts. However, there is no doubt left in anyone, th a t  i t  will have 
significance in  the first place, by the contracts with long lasting bindun- 
gen. A rem ark seem to belong here for the practice too. I t  happened very 
often, th a t  by general contractual conditions too, — which are, as it  is 
known, in case of acceptance, equal with the  contract —, the parties, 
respectively the issuers of the blanks, repeated the legal provisions of 
co-operation, but have said no more abou t the field of co-operation, and 
abou t its detailed methods. I t  was even before now not suitable. From 
now on, to repeate the general convention, will be all the more unneces­
sary. 'Phe concrete form of co-operation, m ust be p u t into words, instead.
I t  is an universal fact, in the positionally changed contract, the 
growing o f cogency, the ranges of those contracts, which automatically 
become, the  tenors of the contracts. The cogency is an instrum ent, also 
against the uneven, unequitable, socially useless tenors of the contract. 
Gleaming in the ('Lb., we find among the general rules o f contract, the 
w arran ty  to state , the tenor of contracts. "The provision of law is per­
m itted to define the single elements of tenor, and is perm itted  to  sta te , 
to  have them , as elements, even in th a t case, if the cliants stipulating
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contrary . (CLb. 220. § (1) sec.). Never the less, the provision of law can 
change the  tenors of the  contract, draw n up  before it  came into effect, 
only on rare occasion, (respect to  the agreem ent of cliants), in such case, 
need not unnecessarily prolong the contract with original tenor, -  which 
is deformed by the later affected provision o f law, —, it could bechanged 
by the court of justice on the request of the cliant, and the cancellation 
of i t  is also perm itted . (CLb. 226. § (2) sec.). This cancellation is also due 
in case o f the  in meanwhile change of prarces. [CLb. 226. § (4) sec.]. The 
rules of single contract typs, ire containing m ainly the rules respecting 
the liable tenors of contract, bu t some of it  falls to  the general part of 
contract law. Such are: The CLb’s ordain of the  specification of penalty  
246. § (4) sec., the restriction of exclosing the liability , cited already (1. 
point) (314. § (2) sec., respectively, the rules of the  318. § (2) — (3) sec. .
The con tract’s tenors of the economic organizations, establishes 
mainly, the provision of law, by compulsory force. “To depart from  the 
orders, relating to  transport-contracts, is possible only so far, as it is 
allowed explicitly by the s ta tu to ry  law”. (CLb. 386. § (1) sec.). S ta ted  
the same by the 4<H. § in the case, if  the parties of contract, are economic 
organizations. The forthcomm ing of cogency reflects in the  rules ot 
single contracts differently.
n )  The s ta tu to ry  provision compulsoryly establishes, v irtua lly  the 
whole — norm ative determ inant — tenor of the contract, b) th e  s ta tu to y  
provision establishes — in the defence of the  in firm er p a rty  — the  m ini­
mal tenor of the contract, c) the departure from  dispositive rules, though 
i t  is no t compulsory, b u t it  is worth considering by  the  cliants, and by 
th e 'c o u rt of law, is beeng binded to particular conditions. The statutory 
provision stipulates with compulsory force, the  norm ative, definable 
tenor o f transport-contracts, of public utility-contracts, and of undertaking 
k in d /if  contracts of the economic organizations, 
gri, 'phe s ta tu to ry  law defines by obligatory force, the m inim um  behaveour 
of the economic organizations a t  the travel-contracts. [The 1/1978 (II I . 
1.) MT sz. rule]. According to the pointed ou t rule, the departu re  ol the 
rules of travel-contract, for the travel-agency, is only possible, in the  
benefit o f the  traveller. The agency is allowed to  tooffer more, can take 
more care, can take upon more responsibility, b u t less, as it  is defined by 
the provisions of law, can not.
The half congent or strongly dispositive rules, have alm ost w ithout 
notice, — though not by chance — been inserted into the rules of the  
congent and  the  dispositive. The meaning of dispositiv ity  originally 
was, th a t the cliant by the contract, could devert, w ithout fu rther ado, 
from such stipulations, if their interests have so requested. The disposi­
tive rule has been established by the law, as a regard of standard, to  offei 
it  to  the cliants, as optim al solution, to  settle their p riv ity . In  the  tim es, 
when, practically in all goods-contract equally s itua ted  goods-owners 
have taken  part, the dispositive rules have lived their golden age, the  
parties have really departed  from the rules only, when their relations 
have much differed from the standard . The ignoreing of dispositive rules,
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or substitu ting  it by o ther agreement, fulfilled the interests of all parties. 
1 hat was also their in tention, so, in plural. Of course, a  piece of trickery, 
had not scared any of them  away.
However, since the world has got so far, th a t the economical life 
brings into contact with each-other, the large adn the small, the powerful 
and the infirm er, the legaly erudite  and the ignorant, the large the power­
ful and the legaly erudites have soon realised, th a t by  putting  off the 
dispositive rules, they  are gaining a new com petition device. “Therefore, 
the general pu tting  aside of the dispositive rules, by the onesidedly wor­
ked out business conditions, is by no means suitable for the aims of the 
dispositivity , and the “law ”, created in general conditions expresses not 
in the least, the legislative will behind the individual contract standards"20. 
The dispositive rules play a very im portan t p a rt a t  the legal realization, 
by the economical transactional aimes, also by the interests considera­
tion, and by the d istribution o f risks.
Now, the refined technique of legislation, has found again, — in 
my opinion — the right solution. The CLb. has also worded two instances 
of the departing o f dispositive, not in principal though, but the one who 
can read, will understand  it.
The general precept: the  dispositive rules, can be p u t aside. The 
particular precept: there are dispositive rules, which are forthw ith possib­
le to be pu t aside. But there are such ones as well, — and it will be good, 
if the practice also notices it  — , th a t can be only disregarded, in the case 
of particu lar conditions. The legislation has created such rules, concer­
ning the individual con tract standard , aim ing to  prevent, the visually 
corrupt practice of the economical overpower. The tu rn  of legal technique: 
it  is possible to  depart from  the dispositive rules, when it is expressed in 
an exeptionally i f ” form. The cliant, who wish to  depart from the dis­
positive rules, — in the tria l — has not only to prove, the agreem ent 
abou t the departure with the o ther party , b u t has also to prove, th a t 
the exeptionally i f  , has been realised too. Exam ple: According the 
s ta tu te  of 14/1978/IT I.l.) MT. sz., containing the detailed rules of 
economical produce m arketing contract, if  the producer is an economic 
organization, the place of fulfilm ent is, the  com pany of the growers.21 
Phe rule deciding the place of fulfilm ent, is dispositive, bu t the wording 
of it  shows, th a t  the legislator holds it more desirable as usual, it to succed, 
with o ther words, he wants the parties not even with “m utual agree­
ment , to depart from the solutions of thés ta tu  tory  provision. Referres 
to this, the second sentence of the 0. § of the order in council; a “depart 
from the agreem ent sits particulary than , if  the qualification is possible 
only, by the instrum ents disposed a t the com pany of the custom er”.
The blanks were often m entioned. These are the standardised con­
tracts of masslurnovers induced by massprodvetion.
\  ékas points a t the  fact, th a t “the basical danger of standardised 
contracts is, the exploitation of the situation of economicaly infirm er, 
and of the legaly infirm er. 22 The onesidedly profitable conditions of 
blanks everywhere they were issuedhave given a rise to vivid disagree-
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m ents.23 Only the socialist civism stayed speechless for a long tim e. I t  
had its reasons too. U ntill we beleved, or we had to beleve, in the heredi­
tary character of the  socialist sta te , not even the though t of it  occured, 
th a t  the  blanks of socialist large concerns — which were approved by 
their supervising au tho rity  — do no t have the best solution. Only after 
the racionality  has replaced the rap tu re  (it did not happen easily)24, the 
science of civism has beginn to  notice, th a t  all th a t  “s ta te ly ” g litters is 
not gold. The fight had began against the blanks. I t  was a sensible fight 
against the blanks o f th a t  tim e, because o f their conten t and also because 
it  was compulsory. Then we did not realise, th a t  there could exist a 
good blank, and there is a bad one too. We were looking for the  m istake, 
in the form of them , and not in the  circum stances hideing behind them . 
But i t  has been clear by the  tim e of m odification of the civil law book, 
th a t  legal entities using the reserves of s tandard  contract, can use the  
blanks to  specify onesided advantages for them selves, b u t their intention 
also can be honest. The 209. § of the CLb. zherefore rules: “Tf the legal 
en tity  by the signing of the contract is employing such onesidedlyspecified 
contractual reserves, which secure unjustified, onesided advantages for  
them, the  damageing clause could be actioned for avoidance by  the  in 
s ta tu to ry  provision separately specified public, or social organizations.” 
The cliant, who is contracting by reserves securing onesided advantages, 
have also the possibility to  action for avoidance of the contract [CLb. 
209. § (3) sec.]. In  the case of succesful inpungm ent o f the blanks, the 
court justice can s ta te  the rescindm ent of prejudical stipulation, — with 
force, comprising to all parties —. I f  the case of action for avoidance, on 
behalf the plaintiff, is well based, the force of decision includes only the 
p lain tiff (CLb. 209. § (2), respectively (3) sec. . I t  is a good rule, if i t  is 
also in the use, it  solves m any problems easily.
However, the 209. § of the CLb. allows the action for avoidance by 
the general reserves of agreements only. I t  does not m ention the  possibili­
ty  of action for avoidance of “business-regulations”. I t  were tim e to  look 
around there too. Some of the issuers of business-regulations have became 
very im pertinent. Example: The Public  Insurance Company in case of 
delay in the paym ent of m otor-car insurance fee, 200. — F t. e x tra  charge 
m ust be paid. Is it  possible to to lerate th a t  ? W ith alm ost 100%, — I  do 
not even know w hat — m ust the delay be paid  off, regardless, it  is im ­
putable to  charge, or not. I t  is a m atter to  th ink about, the  action for 
avoidance should not be made possible, also for business regulation a t  
the court of justice ? Were i t  no t be sensible, to  consider the  constitu tion 
of the court of justice, functioning in such m atters, to  determ ine for the 
upm ost predom ination of competency ?
U p till now, we were going into the details of up-to-date provisions, 
concerning the  situation  before signing the contract, or ra ther w ith the 
requests of them , now in the following we shall ta lk  about how the civil- 
law helps, a fter entering into the contract, their equitableness and social 
serviceableness to succeed. The object of services in the  contracts of 
national economy, are great am ount of products, for servicing , or for
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founding a project. Today, the party  passing the order, however preci/.eh­
est i m ates the needs during a long-term  agreem ent, — yet the agree­
m ents between the  economic organizations are m ostly like th a t  — the 
needs, during the tim e could change, could also cease to  exist. To prolong 
the  agreem ent with original term s, could bring great disadvantages to 
any o f the parties. The up-to-date law, even therefore does not insist on 
the principle of the “pacta  sun t servanda” . For the party  w anting to 
m odificate or resile from contract, the law offers two solutions, the modi­
fication of contract, th e  cancellation, or rescission of contract by law, 
and the cancelltion of contract before the s ta r t  of fulfilment. The modifi­
cation by law, for each contract o f the national economy, is possible. A 
special case o f th a t  is the m odification of the, on the base of contractual 
obligation, signed contract. The difference is, th a t  the court of law can 
modify the contract according to the general rules of contractual m odifi­
cation, no t only on behalf of the parties, (('Lb. 241. §), bu t in the interest 
of national economy too. W hat is more, the court of law can not only 
modify, discontinue, or resciss the  contract, bu t can also keep it in force. 
“In  the scope of contractual liability, the law is allowed to modify, 
to  discontinue to avoid, or to  keep in force the  contract, also 
in the in trest of national econom y” (CLb. 20(3. § (2) sec.). The reason for 
th is in tervention  of law is, to  keep only the  socially beneficial contracts 
in force. B ut they  again should stay . W hether there is a liability of 
contract signing, or not, the one who orders could discontinue any tim e 
the contract with transporter, or undertaker, if lie is prepared to recover 
the  transporter’s, respectively the  undertaker’s damages. (CLb. 381. 
§ (1) sec., 395 § (1) sec.). The legal consequences of voidness are also charac­
teristic. By the  appropriate  comparison of Gyula Eörsi25 the rescinded 
contract is an ill contract. B ut the  illness is either deadly, or curable. I f  
it  is deadly, there is nothing else to  do, bu t to  discontinue it, — and as 
far as possible — to replace the condition existed before the agreement. 
I f  the illness is curable, the pa tien t m ust be saved.
The jurisprudence has urged this solution for a long tim e now, the 
legislation by the  individual contracts also proceeded so, bu t till the 
last m odification of the CLb., the reason to  abate according to the general 
rules, lead to discontinuance, the result o f this m odification of the CLb., 
is in the (2) section oi the 237. §. The main rule henceforward, in the 
case of rescindity is, th a t  the  condition before the  contract, m ust be 
replaced (CLb. 237. § (1) sec.). The course o f action is by all means not 
t he same. “The denounced con tract could be declared valid, if the reason 
of invalidity  — especially by the case of usurious agreem ent, because of 
their m isproportioned services, or ra ther in case of unjustified  onesided 
advantages secured for the legal party , through elim inating the unpro­
portioned advantage — can be ceased” . (CLb. 237. § (2) sec. second sen­
tence). In  the  case of partial invalidity, the main rule stays the same, 
if the agreem ent in any of its p a rt is invalid , (partial invalidity) the whole 
agreem ent becomes void. Exceptions are the  partial invalidity  of the 
contracts of economic organizations.” I f  the contracts bet ween economic
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organizations are p a rtly  invalid , the  legal consequences are referring only 
to  the  invalid  specification b u t the court of law has the righ t to deno­
unce the  whole con trac t.” (CLb. 239. § (2) sec.]. As it can be observed in 
the  specific wording of the s ta tu te , the invalid ity  o f any one p a r t of the  
contract, do not have effect on the rest of it, the  contract stays operative 
in the  parts, untouched by the  reason of invalid ity  and to denounce the 
whole contract is only possible by juridical decision. I f  the  originally 
denounced contract will be reenforced, m ust be taken  care, th a t  all 
stipu lations of th e-co n trac t are kept. The rule of the CLb. 238. § (1) 
sec. serves th a t  purpose. In  the  case of ratification oi an invalid contract, 
the liability  of parties by breaking of contract, concerns them  the same 
way, as the  contract were valid from the beginning.”
4. In  the  course of m odification of the  CLb. in 1977, the i'aricty of 
contracts, inserted in the particu lar part o f the  contractual — law, have 
multi pliai, b u t inspite of this, the num ber oi' mixed, and not typical 
contracts, have increased in the practice. This contradiction was realis­
tic and logical. The increase of contract typs is ou tstanding  by those 
contracts, where the subjects are, (or one of them ), economic organiza­
tions. In  the  ranges of contracts for transactions of m ass-turnovers, 
tand ing  to  deal in goods, and no t of enterprising nature, has emerged 
the public-utility  contract, and the purchasing agreem ent of retail- 
trade  of the  economic organizations practiseing sm alltrade activ ities, 
as d istribu tors for their regular purchasing. The m unicipal sevices con­
tract (CLb. 387 -  388. §), as a contract typ , has gained access to  the  CLb. 
now. “The range of public u tilities widens all the tim e, ang grows the 
im portance of it. The CLb. has to  enclose the basical regulation of the 
public u tilities, as contractual connestions”, sta tes the  3. item  of m inisteri­
al reason comm enting on the CLb. 365 — 397. §.2G The reason to  single- 
ou t this reason is, to  secure the p a rty ’s equality , to  exclude the licenses- 
for executive power of economic organizations, and to  elim inate insecu­
rity , origining from the  despotism  of serviceing organizations, on th is 
v ita l field of u tility  services, (the u tility  trade  can refuse to  contract, 
can denunciate it, or in te rru p t it, and  can res tric t the servicing, only in 
the  instance offered by the provision of law). I t  should be also noted, 
th a t  an enterprise typ , to comply with such s tric t requirem ents, had to 
be called in to  existence. Therefore, the enterprisal legislation, has singled 
the municipal services (public u tility ) ou t from the o ther enterprises, 
and ruled their s ta tu s  specially in the national economy.27
The regular purchasing of economic organizations, displaing small- 
trade activities, has gained a p a rt in the CLb. too, by the m odification, 
even, if it  is, in a form of indicative rule — CLb. 386. § (2) sec.). From  
among the detailed rules of the 7/1978 (II. 1.) MT. sz. departm ental 
order 23 — 33. §, indicating the  strong in tention o f the legislative, to  in­
fluence this kind of relations o f the economy too, by s to u t rules, based 
on the principles of the  civil-law. In  tre  ranges of transactions ot enter­
prising tenor, we can get to know, also a populated  con tract fam ily, in 
the  m odified CLb. 3 9 0 -4 1 6 . §, bu t some p a r t of the  relatives, stilud id
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not get into it. The 7/1978 (II. 1.) MT. sz. order in council 44 — 110. §, 
are containing the  sub-tenors. The separatelly  nam ed contracts i о the 
CLb. are: the building — contract CLb. 4 0 2 -4 0 6 . §, the installation 
con tract CLb. 407. §, the project-contract CLb. 408 — 411. §, the rese- 
arche-contract 4 1 2 -1 4 4 . §, and  the ravell-contract CLb. 41 5 -4 1 6 . §. 
The m entioned order in council, regarding the transport, and the en ter­
prising contracts of economic organisations, takes still further ap art 
the contract tenors in the  CLb. . Rules separatelly, a ttached  to the gene­
ral rules of enterprise, about the  m ain-enterprise 44. §, includes the speci­
fied rules of building-contracts 4 5 -5 9 . §, establishing separate stipu la­
tions by the contracts, signed for repair works a t residental buildings 
6 0 -6 5 . §, the 6 6 -7 5 . § of the order, establishes rules for installation- 
contracts, departing in m any parts from  the  building-contract, -  though 
this ac tiv ity  also belongs to it, on the basis of 407. § —. The order has a 
separate paragraph for the contract of m otor-car servicing 76 — 82. §, 
for detailed stipulations of the planning-contract 83 — 89. §, there is a 
separa te  chapter for the technical m anagem ental planning contract, 
separating  it from  the p lanning-contract itse lf 9 0 -9 3 . §, for the rese­
arch (developmental) contracts 9 4 -  102. §, and for the accom plishments 
of researches (developments), contracts tending to the realisation of 
them  in practice 103 — 105. §. Closing the line of newly particulated  enter- 
prisal contracts, is the building experim ental contract 106 — 110. §. 
This is not the s ta tu te , which includes the detailed stipulations of the 
travel 1-contract, for i t  belongs to the 11/1978 (III. 1.) MT. sz. order in 
Council . We could also m ention the  com pany -law, which also have 
new solution in both, the CLb. 568—577. §, and also the  specified s tip u ­
lations of the associations and companies, included in the 1978 № 4. 
provision of the law, and issued for its enforcem ent 9/1978 (II. 1.) MT. 
sz. order in Council.
Also there is no lack of tenors, sub-tenors, or variations. The legis­
lator tries to  respond to all new occurrences. He disassembles details the 
classical contract tenors, he is not being stingy by the recognition of the 
new, the aparting  from  classical, and yearning for an individual life 
contracts. Hut a t  the sam e tim e he keeps them  in the family. The s ta tu ­
tory  provisions are always hinting a t the now m entioned cases, if  the 
doubted case could not be settled satisfactorily  by the rules, worked 
o u t for single variations, th an  m ust be applied to the more general rules 
o f transport, or enterprisal contract. In  reality  — in my opinion — this 
many kind of “nam ed” contracts do not form separate contract tenors, 
we could at the m ost talk  about, sub-tenors, and variations w ithin the 
sub-tenors. Bearing th is in mind — unless we do w ant to  brake to  pieces, 
or close herm etically from eachother the  contract variations of the in ­
dividual, enterprisal natured  activ ities — carries great im portance on 
practice. In  the firs t p a rt of our dissertation we have pointed, a t the 
connection, between the standard , and the general rules, specifying the 
meaning of the general rules, relating to  the  contract, now one level fu rt­
her down, we emphasise the unifying capacity  of the classical tenors,
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opposite with the tendency to  break off by the sub-tenors, and by their 
Variationen.
5. There are m any tenors, the sub-tenors are even more, and w ithin 
them , are m ass-variationen, yet still groes the num ber of mixed, and not 
typical concrete agreem ents among the economic organizations, res- 
pectly, among the  contracts, in stitu ted  w ith the  co-operation of econo­
mic organizations. I t  has three kind of reasons.
a)  the backwardness of the  singular part of liability  claim,
h) the  in tegration of activ ities separated from each-other, in the 
in terest of solving a  complex program,
c) the anim ation of the tendency of “self-ruling” in the ranges of 
“indiv idual” , and “singular” cases,
In  the praise of the general p a rt of liability  claim, we were n o t mean 
in searching the most beautifulladjectives, b u t abou t the particu lar part 
os the CLb., with the m ost w ithhold, we have to say a t  least so much, 
th a t in some of its parts, is not up-to-date. Also not up-to-date is the 
ruling of such activ ities — unfortunatelly  —, which will have always 
more significance in our modern economy, and have a great p a rt in the 
assets tu rnover of economic organizations. I  hold it to  be such kind , the 
rules of consignm ent — in a way the  assignm ent — of transporta tion , 
and affreightm ent. The affreightm ent in the CLb. even today, is build 
upon the  sheme of “A” consigner, w ith “B ” conveyor, for “C” consignee 
— perhaps — let to  dispatch something. Today i t  is no t typical in tran s­
porting conditions. The connections between the parties are constant, 
manysided, and concerne m any kind of activities, the conveyor fulfils 
com plicated servides, the  co-operation becomes everyday like, the cases 
of con tract breching show other variants too, as were taken  in  account 
in the CLb., the rules of liability  in the CLb. are sticking to  the classical 
stock, to  the conventions, and can not very well ad ap t itself to the chan­
ged situations. For the M inistry of T ransport and Post-offiec, a research 
bv the  controlled Telecomminication and Technical College in Cydr, as 
sub-contractor the E L T E  juridical post-graduate school has organized a 
team  to inquest the conveyoral activities, has found, th a t  affreight­
m ent in accordance with the  opening pattern  is rare, and not a t all su i­
table to  be the base of the affreight-claim. The rules outside the CLb., 
concerning the typical formes of the transports, (railway, water, m otor­
car transports) have taken the changes into consideration, in large, (we 
hope, i t  will still more be considered, in the now under “renovation” , 
the Regulation of M otor-car Transportation GFSz.), b u t we do not see 
the signes of the changed reality in the CLb. The m odernization of the 
general rules of liability  claim, was succesfull. The preparatories of the 
m odification have succesfully managed, the setting  into the CLb., and 
the m odernization of the typical -  untill now separated}- kept from the 
CLb. — contracts of the national economy. In  the following years, the 
a tten tion  should be turned to  the intensive exam ination, and to the 
sta ting  of facts by the m entioned contracts, in the in terest of allowing
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the law to  give help to  these activ ities too, with the knowlegde of these 
results, by instrum ents fitted  for today. But untill th a t  happens, the 
man of practice can only brwe a mixed contract from the single elements 
of various o ther contracts, and if it does not work, can onlv pu t aside the 
official law, and solve the problem by an  atypical contract.
The activities — are also ruled by the law — diffère miate, b u t the 
tasc of them , will be always more complex. A contract, w anting a com­
plex technical, economical, and  legal knowledbe, could hardly be brought 
togeather w ithin a notorious standard , and it is hard, very hard  to settle 
the induced argum ent, — by pressing the contract in any of the s ta n ­
dards —. I t  is useless to increase the  num ber of standard , the sub-stan­
dard, and the varied, by the legislator, if the rea lity  does not fall into 
line with the variant, to  put it in more sim ple wods, the  situations adé­
quat to  legal variants, are not happening, or no t by themselves, to  be 
possible to cover them  completelly by the a lternative version. Especi­
ally, the contracts tending to investm ents and associations are tackleing 
many organizations -  b u t it is oft, by o ther kind o f contracts too -  
which, — perhaps also expressed w ith legal variants, sub-standards, 
and standards — by  the concentration o f the  d ifferentiert activities, to 
solve a  com plicated problem. Such a con tract m ust inevitably  be a varied 
contract, — in the betterease — but, if for the inclusion of any necessery 
activ ity , there is no legal varian t, the contract will be atypical-varied, 
or sim ply varied. The legislator by working ou t the standard , the sub ­
standard . or the varied, a tta ins mainly, th a t instead entering into an 
atypical contract, and as such easily becoming an  ou t of law agreem ent 
the parties enter into a varied contract, where the orientation with the 
help of the general rules of contract, is much easier, as in the  atypical 
contract. \\ e have said already, the more standards, the more varied 
contracts, the atypical ones, and also the more of the varied and atypical 
contracts, the role of standard  rule will be more significant. This is the 
only way to keep some kind of order by the agreements, and to form  them 
after their characteristics in a row. th e re  is a tendency to  “selfadjust­
ing” among the participants of “singular” , and “individual” contracts, 
because of the reasons we mentioned, and otherwise too. Vćkds28 and 
E örsi’ ' too illustrates by m any examples, w hat it means, if the con tract­
ing parties, or only one of them , (both eases have instaces, the first one, 
when two powerful I enterprises signe “singular” , “indiv idual” contract, 
and the second one, when a very powerfull stands against an infirm er, 
or against consumer who is m anipuliert by the infirm er), bu t the disposi­
tive rules of law aside, (the large consernes are faceing each-other from 
the position of power-balance, and in the  situation  of powerfull against 
infirm er, from  the position oi superiority  of power), replaceing it with, 
an agreem enetn departed from th a t, respectively w ith a d ictate. The 
result of them , it the first case is the looseness of the lawfulness, and in 
the second one the conquest o f the infirm er. The “selfruling” stepped 
into the place of dispositive rule, often come into being w ithin the limits 
of the law, but sometimes also outside them . The parties are keeping,
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a t  the very best, the  strick test restrain  norms, b u t in the  place o f official 
law, are piaceing their “p riv a te” law. To proceed against such agreem ents 
before the court of justice, is hardly possible in the  hope of. the righ t 
in the verdict is also being the righ t of the parties, therefore: “The con­
trac tua l litigations are often taken aw ay from the  court o f justices, 
trusting  them  to different corporations, to  business federations, and 
the  x-ules in their hands not necesserily succed, which would have been 
succeded in the legal action. Specially in the  contractual connections of 
large concernées, they  make themselves indipendent of the law, and of 
its mechanism: they  settle the  argum ents o u t of court, on commercial
base.30 I t  is to  understand  a fte r t h i s ....................w ith the establishm ent
of up-to-date capitalism  in the U. S. A., the  central figure -  “legal 
honoratior” — is the legal adviser of large concernes and chief-banks, 
and  no t the judge.31
Such a contracts, I  call an “outlawed contract” . W hy should we in 
the socialist jurisprudence occupy ourselves so intensive in a  s tudy  
“criticizing the capitalism ”, not with the “in ten tion  of denouncem ent” , 
bu t in a s tudy  purpusing to analyse the  newest developm ental tendencies 
of contractual connections, with a special a tten tio n  to the relations of 
the  large concernes, when the  situation  here in socialism is “quite diffe­
re n t” . Therefore, because the conditions on one side are n o t different, 
and on the othe side, even if they  are others, certain  occurances in  enter- 
prisal speres are d iffe rin g  not a t all. I  only w ant to  mention, th a t  econo­
mical overpower exists here too, com petition — deform ed com petition — 
gives also here, we have monopol situations too, also standard isation , 
and an intention o f selfruling leading to “con tract ou t of law ” also exists. 
At the early years o f (id’s, T have pointed ou t in the  researche, com pleted 
on behalf of the  N ational and Jurisprudencial In stitu te , th a t  the under­
takings in food-industry — their blanks a t  this tim e still compulsory - 
how m any onesidedly advantageous regulations, and how m any condi­
tions discrim inating the farm er have they contained. By the facts-exa- 
m inations, and consultations — connected to  the already m entioned 
К PM. research — it has become evident, th a t  in the “indiv idual” , and 
“occasional” contracts, signed for enterprisings of g rea t im portance, 
there is a definite tendency to  self-ruling, to  the evasion of law, and to  
settleing argum ents on a “commercial base” , th a t  in such argum ents the 
central figure is also the  legal adviser, th a t the business friendship should 
not be risked here iehter, by legal actions involved on behalf of some 
kongent rules. I  do no t even w ant to  m ention, th a t  the  breaching of 
contract, signed on legal grounds, does no t lead — not even against 
the original intention of one of the parties — to juridical proceedings, 
because going into war on behalf of the defoulting party , as negotiorum  
gestor, the great powerred County Council, the higher governing body, 
or even the  p a rty  organisation, having in the official declarations quite 
a different a ttitude . T ha t is how we are. I t  is no use to  make objections, 
or to  deny it. So much the more not, as such relations of (monopol s itu a ­
tion, economical power dominance, the preference of certain  undertak-
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ings w ithout reason) not indipendetly  from tlie governm ent, practicing 
economy-directive, and not as a result of spontaneous tu rn  o f circum ­
stances, b u t with participation, still more w ith their launching, have 
developed in such a way, as it did, so, as it  has assum ed its form.
To search a solution in  this scope, is no t the business of civilists, in 
the first place, bu t the directive o f economy. We have to make it right, 
there, where we spoiled them , — if  it  does no t go —, have to  ease the si­
tuation . In  any case, also in the  name of freedom established widest 
tenor oi contract ist no good, if even the most im portan t contract be­
coming the “contract ou t of law ”. I  can no t shere the optim istic s tan d ­
point of Vékas, in “the self-ruling does not always constitu te new law” , 
and  only “it is the m atter only o f over-stepping the lim its of standard  
contracts” , “the  parties in m ost o f the cases are settling  the rights, and
liabilities, building them  on the elem ents o f .................... existing law,
exactly  the  way, as the legal consequences of breaching a con tract” .32
The elements, the bricks, are surely derived from  the law, but 
the building itself, and the m ethod of effectuation ? Even with good ele­
ments can be of low-grade, and wretched. A t first, in the in terest of 
discontinuation of the basical reasons by the no t quite blessed w ith, 
contracts, — agreem ents out of law —, Ï  have throw n the ball to the 
economic organization, now, I  take i t  back. The civilists have also work 
to do. In  w hat?  For example: bringing up-to-date th e  stipulations of 
the contract, decided as out-of-date, to offer appropriate  devices to  the 
self-rulers” for shapeing their rights, liabilities, and responsibilities in 
complex agreem ents. I t  is not a small job.
(3. The services are gaining always a  greater p a rt  in the society. The 
law has draw n its conclus ons quite soon, from  the mass spreading of 
water, gas, and electricity servicing. The s ta tu to ry  provisions relating 
to them , were however out-side the law untill the modification in 1977, 
when the “contract of public u tility  services” was enacted. (CLb. 387 -  
388 §). In  the  next wave widened the heating, and the hot-w ater supply. 
This activ ities were accepted by the law, again outside the CLb., make- 
ing it unfortunatelly  possible to  the service undertakings, to induce 
many, for the custom er disadvantageous, conditions. In  a short periode, 
ol one and a half decade, m any families have mechanised their hous- 
holds, the washm achinen, and centrvfuges, vacuumcleaners, floor- 
polishers, and various houshold m achinen have emerged, Radio (radios), 
recordplayers, m agnetophone, have each family, and the younger gene­
ration  carries their m iniature versions to everywhere they go. There 
are hardly any families, which did not buy the  world in the television 
screen, others have build th e ir family home, or modernised the old one, 
or have bought a car. This m aterial conditions of civilisations are making 
the life easier, untill the good bild, and the sound are alltogeather in 
the television, untill the plaster-work lasts, and  the tap  can be tu rned  
olf, and the car runs, b u t w hat a nuisance is, if  any of them  go wrong. 
A few up-to-date tools m ust be always m aintained, to  have the machines 
live their longest possible life, in a s ta te  of fit to be used. In  evervday
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life, there is a definite displacem ent to  the  benefit of contracts, in te r­
m ediating the services. There are tw o-there or more serviceing ty p  con­
trac ts  to  each kind of service, (repair, renew, m ain tain , keeping clean 
etc.), had the civil-law considered this, or not. Yes, and no. The result 
of th is half, and half solut ion is, th a t  w ith a few repair, and m aintenance 
firm , scam pered the horse away. They have taken  little  on, and for 
th a t, they  did not hurry  to  secure fulfilm ent, and their liability  was 
restricted  to  the minimum. The old w arran ty  rule o f the CLb. made i t  
possible to  charge the  custom er, w ith the fee of, to there and back tra n s­
portations, th a t  the  change of the  hopelessly bad machines have taken  
an endless tim e, th a t  to  reduce the  guarantee to  the m inimum , or ex­
clude i t  alltogeather for the  quality  of services, or the  liab ility  after the 
guarantee-tim e has only stayed  in force, if  the  cliant could prove the 
falsity  of the firm . The CLb. there, has made a great advancem ent by 
the m odification. The m odern rules of assurance, and  guarantee, are 
fulfilling the  claims of the  customer. Stipulations are ruling the com pul­
sory guarantee, by a num ber of products, and by cases of servicing. B ut 
there are still gaps too. The orders of 311. § o f the CLb. could solve w ith 
difficulty, the  correction of badly performed servicings. In  the  interesse 
of faultless servicing, therefore there is also som ething to  do. Did any ­
th ing  happen in the  parti cidar p a rt too ? Yes i t  did. W ithin the  contracts 
for work, labour and m aterial, a few activ ity  of servicing natu r, even in 
the  view of their servicing natu r, did get a singular rule, the order in 
council by the  contracts of transport, and by  the  contracts for work, 
labour, and m aterial of the undertakings has taken  even more on, it  
nam ed the contract of jobs for tenem ent house repairs, and  for m otor­
car repair services, regulated m any other nam ed sub-standards, and 
variants too, taking in to  consideration, the servicing n a tu r o f them . 
I t  seems, th a t  the court of justice, beside these rules, does not have to  
apply to  the tactic  of the  “distortion of m eaning” and need no t apply 
to  the no t adéquat rules of assurances, m ust no more apply for compen­
sation to force the constructor to  the  repairing of errors, falling typically 
under the guarantee ranges, and to  do th a t  repair, to  su it all require­
ments, as in the  interesse of the consumer, the High Court og Justice  
has done, — in the xanges of faults by lodgings, otherwise, i t  has done 
i t  very righ tly  —. There are improvements, hut too few , and it is mainly 
outside the law, and there is no conception. I t  is beyond doubt, even for a 
m inute, th a t  the basic s tandard  of contracts, tending to services, is the 
contract for work, labour and material. One m ust lay hand also on this 
contract group here, abou t the same way, as by the tran sp o rt contract 
group — in princip — were made separate rules for m unicipal services 
contracts. The single contracts for services are wide spiead. A fter a 
thorough search of facts, the  typicalness of them  (good, or bad) could be 
gathered. Such a collection could also be adapted  for generalization. 
A fter generalising the facts, in all probability, could such stipulations be 
worked out, which could enclose mutual codes of the contracts fo r services. 
I t  wei’e possible to  establish a sub-standard of the contract for work,
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labour, and m aterial, on the modeli o f contracts for building, planning, 
etc., which would hold togeather the typicalities of the allready formed 
con tract varie ty  of service natu r, than  i t  were perhaps not necessery, 
to  make for each im portan t service a different — the allready vast masses 
of s ta tu to ry  provisions — to  swell with neverending series — new legal 
varie ty  to  establishe. W orking i t  ou t from the  principle of standard  
contract, would be possible to  form factual contracts, perhaps also 
blanks.
Untillnow we were interlacing our sentences, giving a tten tion  only 
to  services, offered by the undertakings. B u t serviceing is also offered 
by craftsm an, sm all-contractors, and the  num ber of them  are increasing. 
I t  could come in to  question, th a t  in  the future, they  (do not reach the 
level of co-operative) unite  in  a com m unity. E ven therefore, is no t a last 
resort to  squeese the  enterprisal s tandard  contracts. I t  also gives a reason 
to  the  in tensiver arrangem ent of th is contract group. In  such a stipu la ­
tion, perhaps, the  signing o f a  contract could be m ade compulsory, could 
s tipu late  the  liability  of guarantee, the  com plexibility of repair, (exept, 
the  contractin  p a rty  does not wish it  th a t  way), the  place of fulfilm ent, 
the  responsibility for service, and cases of liability, where perhaps, there 
is a need for exeptional rules. I t  is still no t enough. The service could 
n o t be the  single object of the contract, bu t can be one of the  elements 
of the  varied contracts too, (avising, schooling, refresher-course, re­
train ing, giving over technology, boring, exam ination of the soil, obser­
vation  of the  climate). I  have noticed, th a t  this services somehow, are 
passing by, — especially in the row o f responsibility, and liability  —, 
beside the  main service. Exam ple: in the  contract for bulk delivery of 
produce, th e  custom er singles ou t the seed, will decide on technology, 
will ordain, and choose the  proteetives, and the fertiliser m anure, etc., 
in one word, representing typical service activities. But really, the  legal 
codes keep deep silence abou t it. I t  is no wonder, if the party , which 
offer the  service, in case of m iscarriage happened through errors by the 
service, lie low, could also back out of responsibility and could be court 
only, w ith tricky, arb itra ry  in te rp re ta tion .33 I t  m ust be also provide 
for, th a t  the  legal settlem ents of those “hidden” services. N ota bene, if 
there will be a standard  con tract on its own for services, or a sub-stan­
dard  w ithin the undertake, could also provide help, by  the  argum ents, 
origining from services, which are hidden, in the contracts for o ther 
k ind of m ain service. Our contractual system  have developed dinami- 
caly. The CLb., and o ther provisions of law, have forwarded i t  very 
much. In  the nex t decades however, the  changes will speed up still 
more, an r for keeping up  with them , our contractual law, has the task  
of on one side the  following up the tracks by the s ta tu to ry  provisions, 
on the o ther side, gathering the exploitable experiences, for allowing 
also the  Codes to  express the changes, and to  be able to  influence the 
fu rth e r measures by its prestige.
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НОВЫЕ ЧЕРТЫ НАШЕЙ ДОГОВОРНОЙ СИСТЕМЫ
Проф. д-р. ИМРЭ ШАРАНДИ 
(Резюме)
1. Противоречия общей обязательной сиды договора и правил договорного типа.
2. Новые черты возникновения договора.
3. Договоры заключенные при стандартизированных условиях и договоры ин­
дивидуального типа.
4. Расширение договорных типов новые важные договорные типы.
5. Расширение договоров направленные на обслуживание и отсутствие конт­
рактовых типов типа обслуживания.
NEUE ZÜGE UNSERES VERTRAGSSYSTEMS
von
PR O F . D R. IM R E SÄRÄNDI:
(ZUSAMMENFASSUNG)
1. Die W idersprüche zwischen der allgemein b indenden K raft des V ertrages und den 
Regeln des V ertragstyps
2. Neue Züge des E n tstehens des Vertrages
3. V erträge u n te r standard isierten  Voraussetzungen und E inzelverträge
4. Die Zunahm e der V ertragsarten . Neuere wesentliche V ertragsarten
5. Die Zunahm e der Anzahl der Ueistungs vert rage, das Fehlen der V ertragsarten 
von L eistungstyp
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